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STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPING THE RIGHT LEADERS FOR THE OBJECTIVE FORCE-AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXCEL

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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TITLE:

Strategy for Developing the Right Leaders for the Objective Force—An

Opportunity to Excel

FORMAT:

Strategy Research Project

DATE:

1 March 2002

PAGES: 39

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Attrition rates are high! The Army must transform to the Objective Force! Senior leaders are out of touch with junior leaders! Technology is growing by leaps and bounds! The Army must retain captains twice non-selected for promotion to major and majors twice non-selected for promotion to lieutenant colonel! These challenges to Army leaders are occurring at a most difficult time—the Army's transformation to capitalize on changes in technology and address new and asymmetrical threats to national security. While taking on these new missions and challenges, the Army's core mission remains the same: to deter war and if deterrence fails, fight and win our nation's wars. While force structure changes have garnered the most attention in the transformation strategy, every aspect of the Army's existence will change or be affected by this transformation process. One element that will be key to the transformation success will be the leadership and leadership development adjustments that must support, keep pace with, and in some areas lead the Army's transformation efforts.

This paper looks at a strategy for addressing the full spectrum of Army leadership that will yield leaders that can lead a digitized objective force and the millennium generation in 2020 and beyond. With information from leadership studies as a baseline, this paper assesses and, where applicable, proposes adjustments to the Army's leadership and mentorship doctrine, professional development program, evaluation system, and promotion program—all of which are essential tools that must play a role in the Army's move to the objective force.

Transformation is difficult enough for any organization and trying to address leadership problems as well can be daunting to even the greatest of armies. Without adjusting leader development as a part of this Army transformation process, the objective force will not have the leader competency and character necessary to successfully lead soldiers and accomplish the mission in changed circumstances. The leader development road ahead in this transformation process is truly an "Opportunity to Excel."

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LEADERSHIP: CHALLENGES AND TRANSFORMATION

...But a true leader is not satisfied with knowing only how to do what will get the organization through today; you must also be concerned about what it will need tomorrow. You must strive to master your job and prepare to take over your boss' job. In addition, as you move to jobs of increasing responsibility, you'll face new equipment, new ideas, and new ways of thinking and doing things. You must learn to apply all these to accomplish you mission.

- Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership

The Army is transforming to the objective force to meet the nation's anticipated needs in 20-30 years. The transformation is necessary to adjust to projected changes in technology, to account for a recent redefinition of the Army's mission, and to adjust to and develop the new skill sets necessary to fight more asymmetrical threats. Leadership will be a key to a successful transformation process.¹ We can never be satisfied with our state of leadership, especially when the people being lead (new generation) and the conditions under which leadership occurs (transformation, peacekeeping, combat) are significantly changing. A key to the Army's success has always been and will always be in its ability to grow confident, capable, and ethically sound leaders. The Army's transformation success will lie in the ability of these type leaders to successfully accept, support, and adapt to change while simultaneously meeting the difficult mission requirements the Army faces today and in the future.

The Army draw-down during the 1990s and the officer retention problems from 1998 to the present have resulted in several studies and surveys about what is wrong with the Army's leadership program. The cultural effects of the draw-down, the cry of zero defects, the bureaucratic envelopment of small units and their leaders, and the notion of out of touch senior leaders have caused many to question our leadership doctrine. The Army's digitization program and technological advances, to include non-lethal technology, have given the Army a small glimpse of the pace, lethality, and stress of the future battlefield. More information to process, more need for accurate and timely information, and growing impatience from operational through strategic and national leadership levels to get results (action and information) quickly will place stress on Army leaders in amounts never before experienced.

If the Army is not careful, these conditions can diminish trust between the organization and those within, between leaders and those being led. Any band-aid approach, only addressing the symptoms, to inculcating Army mentorship and bolstering leadership and leader effectiveness will do little to solve the Army's leader problems now or as it transitions to the objective force. More than ever, future Army leaders must be able to live the pyramid of

influence—influence (telling, explaining, teaching), relating (communicating and trust), and modeling (through example)² both up and down the organizational spectrum. Consequently, promotion, professional development, and mentoring programs must be integrated and mutually supporting to best posture Army leaders for success.

Solutions to meeting tomorrow's challenges must have a holistic approach where leadership development is the cornerstone from which the Army is shaped for future success. This paper examines the Army's leadership challenges and then considers improvements in leadership competencies and professional development required to meet the demands expected in the objective force. The concerns and recommended improvements addressed include leadership doctrine, mentorship, professional leadership development through schools and assignments, officer evaluation reports (OER), promotion and separation policies, identification of future leaders, and managing the technology and change process. If the Army does not adequately address these concerns, captain attrition will be the least of its worries.

THE ENVIRONMENT

An important step in studying or developing solutions to a problem is to understand the nature of the environment. Today's leaders face an "environment characterized by uncertainty and unpredictability" and in 2030, should expect to operate in a fast paced, information dominant environment. The environment presents the Army four challenges: leadership shortfalls that must be addressed; unique requirements due to the magnitude of the Army's Transformation Campaign Plan (ATCP); mastery of digitization and advances in information technology; and leading a new generation, the millennium generation. If solutions don't address these challenges, our leadership problems will grow significantly and many leaders will increasingly flock to the national and international opportunities outside of the Army.

LEADERSHIP SHORTFALLS

Current leader surveys and development panels have identified areas requiring renewed emphasis in leader development. The Army Research Institute (ARI) and Army Training Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) studies indicate that the Army has leadership problems and that these problems are causing officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) to leave the service in greater numbers than the Army can accept. Among some of the dominant concerns are the OER, leadership development programs, and promotion systems. The results of ARI annual surveys have led to a number of "germane reports" that identify job satisfaction, time for

personal family life, senior leadership, integrity and professionalism, overall quality of life, and pay and compensation as key to the decision making process of officers exiting service.⁴

The Army Chief of Staff (CSA), General Shinseki, chartered the ATLDP to look specifically at training and leader development as part of the ATCP. Among many findings, the panel found that those surveyed thought the Army expected more commitment from the officers and families than it currently provided to them; the Army is not providing adequate leader development experiences; top down directives and strategies lead to a perception of pervasive micromanagement; there is less contact between seniors and subordinates than is optimum; the OER is still of questionable validity and utility; personnel management requirements are not synchronized with operational and developmental experiences; and training resources are constraining to leaders.⁵ Additionally, majors and lieutenant colonels are leaving the service in greater numbers due to a lack of commitment to the army, limitations on spouse employment, imbalance between army operations and the family, lack of work predictability, and little control over assignments.⁶ Unfortunately, even with these results, many times leaders are more concerned about attacking the survey results than addressing the issues identified.

The study, released in 2001, has caused consternation and angst among senior leaders. When junior leaders indicate that the organization is not providing a reciprocal level of commitment, trust, and professionalism (components of loyalty) their desire to stay in the Army declines dangerously. Loyalty is a basic foundation of the military profession and findings that indicate a decline in loyalty are very troubling. When loyalty declines, professionalism will erode and will result in a shallow, weak and ineffective Army. Declines in loyalty and professionalism are also dangerous because they tear at the heart of Army warrior ethos and leadership, the trust and confidence of leaders by those being led. While the organization might survive in spite of itself, major missions such as transformation or even the conduct of war are in danger of failing or overtaxing the institution.

Army Transformation poses a significant challenge for leaders. A recent ARI Newsletter titled 21st Century NCOs suggests that the Army must study the transformation process with respect to projecting the "personal attributes and experiences" that the Army can anticipate needing in 2010 for achieving successful performance.⁷ Major change in any organization is difficult. Change typically presents conditions that are ripe for questioning loyalty, competence, and integrity. While science and technology (ST) can necessitate or facilitate a transformation, it takes the human dimension to see the transformation process through. The human dimension is the predominant reason change in an institution is so difficult.

When asked, captains will tell you that the Army's reluctance to change its culture is the greatest obstacle to the ATCP. The biggest obstacle facing transformation will not be what the ST experts develop or fail to develop, but rather leaders within and supporting the organization thwarting sincere and necessary efforts to change and to improve methods and effectiveness of operations. The Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, recently stated that the departments must restructure and consolidate to become more efficient. He stated that the institution is its own worst enemy, its greatest adversary and called for a shift from bureaucracy to battlefield, a move that is a matter of national security. Can transformation work? Yes, but it will take more than General Shinseki and Secretary Rumsfeld to effect the changes. It will take more than an office or two in the Pentagon to effect change. Transformation will occur only if all leaders see the process through. It takes enlightened leaders—something we need to develop to transform successfully.

MASTERY OF DIGITIZATION AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

The Army has and will continue to face leadership challenges associated with informational technological developments. Currently, the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) System "brings situational awareness down to the lowest level," complete with real-time information about friendly forces, enemy forces, and the terrain. The system translates every piece of friendly, enemy and terrain information into a digital map that is updated in real time. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), spot reports, and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) contribute to input of information for this particular system. However, advances in information technology such as these flood leaders and subordinates with an over-abundance of information, and, if early indications are accurate, increase the appetite for quicker and more accurate information. Additionally, there are also indications that this capability has other, counterproductive effects—feeds a desire for greater certainty before making decisions (ironically hindering timely decisions) and increases our vulnerability when these systems are denied leaders (malfunction, cyber warfare attack, etc.) because we have become too dependent on them.

To date, we have not learned how to manage the information technology growth we have experienced the past ten years. We produce more reports and more intricate slide presentations than ever before. Now we might face an additional problem. A training study finding indicated that "at platoon and company level, digitization pushes trainers out of the unit's information loop…"¹⁰ Trainers, or leaders, pushed out of the information loop can cause two problems. First, units will have trouble training and assessing some of the more technologically

advanced systems because of how the systems were developed. Second, because of the way the systems interact, one data entry error punched in at any level will move through the system at much greater speeds than the reaction time to halt that information will flow. If we are not careful, unit command posts might find themselves behind the power curve or with wrong critical information at a key decision point.

LEADING A NEW GENERATION

Leadership across generations, each with different developmental experiences and mindsets, can be especially challenging. In *Leadership: The Warrior's Art*, Christopher Kolenda discusses whether new ideas on leadership are necessary to effectively lead millennium generation soldiers. His answer is both yes and no. A portion of his thesis is that the human dimension of leadership will become more and more important in a technologically advanced army in the future. The key to future leadership success will lie in how leadership incorporates and adapts to challenges and techniques associated with leader competencies shaped by advances in technology and organization. A danger exists when leaders accept the premise that the more technologically advanced the Army becomes, the less opportunity or even necessity will exist for leaders to get down on the ground to see what is going on. The argument is that the millennium generation, as with any generation, although able to work relatively alone with technologically advanced equipment, will still require the human dimension of leadership the Army has espoused throughout its history.

The millennium soldier is a technologically advanced segment of our military. Although they are connected to an "Army of One" construct, they will still influence a group's effectiveness much like the "baby boomer" and "generation X" did as they came through the system. Those who understand the problem and understand those being led will be better able to influence the end-result. The millennium generation soldiers are not much different than the soldiers of Generation X. They like to be challenged and are not satisfied with the status quo. According to recent studies, the millennial soldier is also largely upbeat, not self-absorbed and fairly trusting of authority. ¹² The Army must capitalize on this. These soldiers must be challenged for it is in the challenge that they really grow and then inculcate many of the values the Army needs as an institution. To the millennium generation, a sense of accomplishment provides a greater personal reward than a senior leader might normally expect. It is the sense of common hardship and success that brings more comradeship and drives the newer generations harder.

In studying the facets of leading new generations, subordinates' core values have not changed much. The essence of what makes a person respond has not changed. Officers

continue to say they stay in the Army because they love soldiers—working, talking with, and leading soldiers. Subordinates still want to be cared for and respected. "Respect forms the bond of cohesion and teamwork among subordinates, peers, and leaders that will enable a unit to function effectively under the stress of combat." Without respect, loyalty wanes and job satisfaction decreases to the point where another good officer leaves the service. Perhaps if leadership techniques more suited to his generation were used, he would have remained.

Stephen Covey identifies three types of power: coercive, utility, and principle-centered. Coercive power is absolute; do this because I am in charge or else. Utility power is mutually beneficial to the leader and subordinate; get this done and we'll go home. Principle-centered power is power respected because of earned trust and confidence, respect and honor; the subordinate follows because he or she trusts the leader and knows the leader will do everything to help the subordinate be successful. Although coercive and utility powers have been successful in the past and have their place in certain military settings, the principle-centered power will continue to provide the greatest opportunity for organizational success and growth. When applying principle-centered power, the millennium soldier is no different than the revolutionary, civil war, or Viet Nam soldier in terms of how this principle best fosters individual and organizational benefits. Future soldiers, as soldiers have in the past, will respond best in the long term, to principle-centered leadership.

OPPORTUNITIES TO EXCEL

To meet the leadership challenges of today and of the objective force, the Army will have to shed some of its culturally comfortable ways of conducting business. The world has changed and while the Army must always be ready to fight and win our nation's battles, it must do so while conducting the other missions the nation calls it to do. These operations other than war will place soldiers and leaders in difficult situations that call for more than tank or combat strength. These operations have and will continue to require an Army that understands where it is, who it is working with, and what the desired outcome is from a more national or political perspective than from just the military perspective. Understanding leadership doctrine for the objective force and evaluating the personnel programs, from assignment through schooling, are necessary to ensure the objective force Army is ready, willing and able to meet the nation's challenges. Good leaders will look at these challenges as another opportunity to excel and lead the Army to greater success.

LEADERSHIP DOCTRINE

Leadership demands officers possess good judgment, a clear understanding, and foresight. He/she must be an educator in every field and distinguish himself by superior knowledge and experience, moral excellence, self-control and courage. ¹⁵ Unquestionably, leaders must have the self-discipline to learn, grow professionally, and lead twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week. To this end, the Army's leadership doctrine has been relatively successful at meeting this challenge throughout its history. But having sound doctrine alone does not produce good leaders. Recent attrition studies seem to indicate that some leaders are gradually dismissing their responsibilities. Essentially, the Army has a growing number of officers who, if they know leadership doctrine, fail to apply it. There is more to being a leader than knowing one's ABCs of leadership.

The application of the Army's leadership doctrine served the Army well as it recovered from the Viet Nam era leadership deficit. Recent surveys, however, indicate leadership deficiencies may be increasing even though the Army has a new leadership manual. The new leadership manual, Field Manual (FM) 22-100, has many of the same concepts that previous versions included. Missing, though, are time-tested basic leadership principles and leadership traits the Army preached and practiced heavily as it fixed the leadership deficits after the Viet Nam war. Throughout its history, Army leadership doctrine at one time or another included: "three attributes, three perspectives, three imperatives, fourteen skills, and eleven principles." Now, in place of these leadership traits and principles are detailed discussions of Army values and attributes. The doctrine remains sound, but key imperatives of being a leader were lost in the current manual.

Yesteryear, soldiers could recite leadership principles and doctrine. Today, not many even pick up the manual—it does little for them. One possible reason is that the Army culturally promotes developing new terminology rather than focusing on application of theory to the current environment. In a recent Army Magazine article, writers suggested that "FM 22-100 does not suffice for the objective force" and that objective force leaders will require new skill such as adaptability and self-awareness. ¹⁷ Adaptability is not a new concept; leaders have always found it necessary to be adaptable. Self-awareness is not a new concept either. A leadership principle in former doctrine advocated that leaders must know themselves and seek self- improvement. The Army does not need new leadership doctrine, only a refinement of the FM to ensure it captures not only how to lead but how to be a leader in today's environment. Changes to the FM should capture new doctrine for leading coalition forces and for developing critical analytical skills and do so in a manner that permits quick referral and easy access. Such

a rewrite of the FM would permit the maintenance of the classical leadership principles and traits that alone provide the foundation for a leader to apply the skills needed at various leadership levels. What the FM must capture better is how to apply the leadership traits and skills to the current environment.

MENTORING

Leaders have a definite responsibility to "lead their organizations to victory" or success. This pursuit of success for the organization starts with ensuring the personal success of each and every member of the organization. The Army has recently emphasized mentorship as a vehicle to help reach this success. The Army mentorship program today, though, is not functioning as intended for three predominant reasons. First, there is a general disconnect between the classical definition of mentorship and what the Army is portraying as mentoring. Second, some senior leaders don't fully understand the Army's mentoring doctrine and therefore the implementation of the concept varies from the ideal. Third, mentoring is not being applied effectively at the right levels.

Anyone can mentor and the process includes both "instruction and action." Field Manual 22-100, Army Leadership, defines mentoring as: "proactive development of each subordinate through observing, assessing, coaching, teaching, developmental counseling, and evaluating that results in people being treated with fairness and equal opportunity. Mentoring is an inclusive process (not an exclusive one) for everyone under a leader's charge."20 However, the classical interpretation describes a mentor as a trusted guide and counselor over the lifetime of the individual and this relationship is characterized by close contact, observation, and assessment of performance. In contrast, the Army definition implies that one mentors a subordinate under his/her charge as a function of leadership which typically is one or two years, not a lifetime and certainly not with close observation. The result is we have some senior leaders who stop "mentoring" upon departure to a new duty station and we have some who mentor without really knowing what the subordinate has recently done. The danger is that the mentor might give uninformed advice or champion a cause that is not appropriate for performance or professional development of the recipient. A greater danger occurs when a "mentor" champions for advancement an individual who is ill-suited for the advancement. To improve our mentor program, changes must address a capability to provide "close-in" observation and assessment so the proper guidance, counseling, and relationships can be applied. Coaching may be the better term for the Army's requirements.

Another problem with the current application of the mentorship program is that there are senior raters at battalion command level and above who do not realize that the Army mentoring program instructs that they mentor all their subordinates. In a recent panel discussion on the OER at the Army War College (AWC), several former battalion commanders expressed they did not have the time to mentor more than one or two subordinates and some went further to state that they only mentored those that were most deserving and who had a chance for advancement to senior leadership levels.²¹ The Army is in a poor state of affairs when a battalion commander is too "tied" up with management that he/she does not have time to mentor subordinates. Time management is one area that the Army must substantially improve upon to allow for greater opportunities to mentor. Every senior leader should look down one and two levels and ensure subordinate leaders have the time to mentor their subordinates. Leaders must make the time to pass on knowledge, experience, and common sense that is wed to subordinate leaders.

Mentoring today is more important than ever because today's officers are much more savvy about managing their careers, much more informed about the good and bad jobs in their branches, much more sensitive to any indication that they are no longer "on the fast track", and demand more performance feedback. At the first sign of career derailment, they are more prepared to pursue other opportunities. Somehow, the Army must find ways to break the culture that states if you don't move up and do so quickly, its time to seek a new career. One way to address this concern is through the correct application of leadership. Today's junior officers need mentoring that instills trust in both their senior leaders and in the organization. Positive and face-to-face personable leadership is much more important today, in a time when technology actually allows less or more distant leader-subordinated relationships, than ever before. It is through personable and positive relationships that today's savvy officers understand the true meaning of caring leadership and selfless service. These traits endear continued service more than most other traits.

Most authorities on mentoring seem to agree that trust is a basic tenet of a mentoring relationship. Currently then, we have a real dilemma because indications are that junior officers do not trust senior officers, they don't have faith in their ability to mentor junior officers, and that senior officers don't understand junior officers.²³ To junior officers, there are senior leaders who consider spending five minutes with a junior leader engaged in small talk at a range is adequate for professionally developing or mentoring. Captains also point out that some senior leaders use micromanagement as a substitute for developing or mentoring a subordinate. Yet, the CSA and other senior ranking officers are telling battalion and brigade commanders to mentor their

lieutenants, captains and majors. Before we can fix mentoring, senior leaders must first gain the trust of subordinates. The Army must also be a part of the trust process. For instance, there are some contradictions between what the institution says and what is done. You can't tell junior officers to not sweat the small stuff and then demand every piece of silverware and dishware be highly polished for a Commanding General's (CG) visit to a unit. You can't tell captains to take command of a garrison or Table of Distribution Allowances (TDA) company because command is command and then allow lieutenant colonels and colonels to decline these same type commands because they might not want to command that type unit or in that location. You can't tell junior officers things will get better and the Army is caring for its own and then select folks for Command and Staff College (CSC) and Senior Service College (SSC) and give them less than six months notice prior to reporting. Nor can you state that there is no micromanagement problems yet mandate a Colonel/06 sign a document certifying that every soldier received training on a certain subject. This type micromanagement does more to drive junior officers from the military and its thrilling challenge of being a leader than the Army gives credit for. There is an apparent lack of trust at all levels of the Army bureaucracy and until we fix this, mentoring will not reap the benefits intended.

PROFESSIONAL AND LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT THROUGH SCHOOLS

Professional Military Education (PME) plays a key role in leadership development. In fact, whether talking of unit training or schoolhouse training, weak and ineffective training obstructs the development of military competence and is unethical.²⁴ Ronald Heifitz correctly argues that leadership requires a learning strategy. "The common personalistic orientation to the term leadership, with its assumption that leaders are born and not made, is quite dangerous. It fosters both self-delusion and irresponsibility."²⁵ Those who believe leaders are "born" rather than "made" run the risk of not adequately developing leaders leaving to chance that these born leaders will automatically gain the skill sets necessary to effectively lead in a volatile and complex environment. The other danger is that such a philosophy will result in casting aside later bloomers and others who do not seem naturally gifted in this area.

One ATLDP finding was that Army training and development programs need to develop self-aware and adaptive leaders. Schools and senior leaders both play a key role in fostering self-awareness. Schools generally provide adequate feedback in the small-group learning environment for an officer to get a good assessment of where he or she stands in terms of technical competence. Today's leaders, though, are afraid for the most part, to tell someone when he/she falls short of performance expectations. Leaders have grown progressively worse

at the "difficult" counseling. It seems more palatable to move someone to a lesser job when they don't succeed in the more difficult job. Then leaders give these same officers an evaluation report that says the officer did a "good" or an "excellent" job, knowing the words are but faint praise and over time, these words may place the officer at risk for promotion. This results in an officer who is not self-aware and who marches through his career feeling good about his performance but is shocked when not selected for promotion, schools, or command. Subordinates along the way are not properly led and the officer shocked by non-selection may try to poison the system with false accusations of how he/she was wronged.

Even this ability to provide relatively "truthful" feedback through small group instruction at the various stages of PME is in jeopardy. The Total Army Distance Learning Plan anticipates that soldiers in the 21st Century will attend streamlined resident courses, preparing themselves through diagnostic-driven, self-paced distance learning modules delivered at home station in unit learning centers, at the job site, or in their residences.²⁷ The danger here is that distance learning only addresses the basic knowledge required to accomplish a task. The application, the experience, the common sense part, and sharing experiences are not normally captured. One of the greatest advantages business professions say the military has over the business world is in our education and leader development system where we twice take officers out of the workplace after the branch level career courses and send them to school for eleven months to further educate them in advanced military studies and leadership. We must ensure we don't diminish the great training programs we have established.

There are several concerns within the Army concerning professional development schools. Some argue that schools are not challenging. Others warn that if not handled properly, the school system will degenerate into an ever expanding bureaucracy that strips line officers from their units for long periods of time at critical points in their career and simultaneously at critical points for unit cohesion building. Still others argue that there is a negative stigma attached to being assigned to Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) or teaching at a school. Officers and NCOs dislike assignments to TRADOC and have an accompanying fear that these assignments will put them behind their peers in terms of development and experience. Board results are sometimes perceived as validating that fear. How this mentality has been perpetuated has to be the biggest failure of the Army as an institution. How can teaching the future leaders of the world's greatest army be negative? Yet, the Army has to fight in some branches to get the best to teach at the schools. The Army has to do better at advocating support to TRADOC and its basic branch schools as well as the higher PME institutions. With the recent significant reductions in TRADOC (reductions in instructors

and branch doctrine writers), the leader development programs are in a downward spiral and we can expect problems to worsen exponentially.

Schools are vital to the development of leaders and complement the mentor and other officer professional development programs at other levels. As the Army moves to better understand the complex world with coalitions and asymmetrical threats that will continue to mark the 21st century, it becomes more apparent that future leaders must be visionaries with an insatiable appetite for further education. Schools must play a key role in expanding the regional and cultural awareness of its leaders. Leadership development must include more emphasis on developing interpersonal skills, a second language, and knowledge of various regions of the world. Knowledge of environments, political realities, and culture will serve the leader well in future operations.

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT THROUGH ASSIGNMENTS

The assignment process plays a complimentary role to training programs by providing opportunities for officers to gain experience and knowledge. It is through exposure to various leaders and assignments that officers become aware of who they are and what they are capable of doing. Officers with a greater variety of experiences are generally more adaptive and even better postured to meet changing threats and changing environmental conditions because they know themselves and they know and understand more about their environment.

The officer assignment process is often misunderstood and abused. Branch Proponent offices define the professional development and promotion qualification requirements in Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3. A problem, though, with our professional development system is that assignment requirements many times override an officer's professional development requirements. As officers move through the assignment process, there is normally no professional development plan in their file for successive assignment officers to review. Complicating matters is the fact that many officers do not have a professional development plan. Many officers therefore move from assignment to assignment based on system requirements, not necessarily by professional development needs. It is not uncommon for someone to be "unexpectedly" passed over for promotion or selection to CSC. When their records are reviewed, the problem is obvious. The last time that officer had been in a tactical unit was as a platoon leader, nine years previously. Typically, there is no professional development plan at the assignment branch or with the officer and his/her mentor. It is also not uncommon to discover that when the officer completed the Captain Career Course (CCC), he/she was told he had to go to a TDA or garrison unit to command since he/she already served

in a tactical unit. After command, the assignment officer might have then told the officer that the needs of the army dictated an assignment to teach at a Reserve Officer Training Command (ROTC) program. After that, it was time for an assignment in a functional area so the officer went to Fort Huachuca to be a Public Affairs Officer. Now it is time for the Major and CSC boards and folks wonder why the officer, who otherwise did well throughout his career, was not selected for CSC. Whose fault—doesn't matter because the damage is done.

Being at the right installation, in the right job, at the right time and with the right commander has a lot to do with opportunities to grow professionally and get the right experiences that will set the conditions for future success. Junior officers understand this much more than senior leaders give them credit for. If they don't know it going into their first assignment, they know it soon thereafter. Once an officer gets to an installation, they may or may not get a position that matches their skills. Some officers feel they are forced into a job whether they have the requisite skills or not. Knowing this, officers posture for the good jobs and although many times they get them, far too often the timing is wrong (job needed is not available) or senior leaders use personnel they are more familiar with in these key jobs and the officer really needing the job for an upcoming board or for professional development can't get it. A DA PAM outlining professional development principles cannot fix this problem. Internal policing by the senior officers in each branch must fix this problem and it will do much to enhance trust in senior leaders and in the professional development system.

Improving the assignment process so that it is more fair and better contributes to the professional development of officers who are most capable of leading the Army through transformation is of paramount importance. When soldiers perceive the system as unfair, they are more likely to exit the service. When the system does not allow for completion of a well thought out professional development plan because of assignment requirements, then officers get to the more senior levels with the possibility of not having the right mix of assignments and professional development to advance further. Personnel Command (PERSCOM) has to take the lead and develop a check and balance system to ensure officers have the right mix of assignments. There are many ways help ensure this right mix of assignments. For example, PERSCOM might assess setting a two-year tour limit for TDA assignments during the first ten years of service and then ensuring overseas and other "hardship" tours are more equitably distributed. As it is now, there are many officers that have nothing but tactical assignments their first eight years while others might have had only one tactical assignment during that period, purely the result of the Army's assignment requirement appetite.

One obstacle to adhering to a professional development plan is the unpredictability in the assignment process. Currently, from month from month, branches do not have a good grasp of what non-branch specific jobs they must fill. These branch immaterial jobs are many times forced upon the branch. There is a "goal," a percentage that basic branches must fill of branch immaterial positions. But even when a branch may be at its goal, they could still be forced to fill additional assignments beyond what they planned for. Filling that position is then forced on the branch whether there are officers who can afford or need that professional development opportunity or not. One possible fix is to assign these immaterial requirements to a branch for a period of five or ten years, so the branch knows what jobs they must fill and can work the professional development plan of its officers more accurately. The recent move to identify requirements one year out is a step in the right direction.

If the recent few years are any indication of the complexity, ambiguity, and volatility of future army missions, the Army must do better at incorporating a leader development plan into the assignment process. This plan must drive the assignment process. Also, to help prepare leaders to meet the growing number of "regional or strategic challenges," the Army needs to consider mandating that officers receive training in a second language, receive regional training so they are more of a regional expert, and be assigned to overseas locations at the company, field grade, and general officer levels. The Army cannot afford to have lieutenant colonels or colonels who have never served overseas or have been overseas one time in their almost 20 years of service. Mandating that officers become regional experts will add to the legitimacy of peace operations we find ourselves engaged in more and more. Currently, there is no real incentive for officers to gain those skills that will be necessary for operating in the objective force. The assignment process must be fixed so that it is less reactive and more proactive, thereby enhancing the professional development program.

THE OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT (OER)

Incompetence is a moral failure and promoting incompetence is just as bad. The OER is lauded by board members and jeered by most junior officers. ATDLP finding OS-26 states that the OER is a source of mistrust and anxiety. Specifically, many officers think the OER system is materially flawed and the system lacks integrity. While the OER is not THE reason officers are exiting service, it is definitely an area of discontent for both those who exit the service and those who stay in. To fix the system and ensure we identify the best officers for promotion, the Army should look to develop an OER that: manifests the rater portion into the board process; has more objectivity built in; eliminates forced distributions that clearly disadvantage officers;

and focuses on the skill sets required in an objective force leader (adaptive, self aware, globally astute, demonstrating cognitive acumen, etc.).

OER writing is a distinctly subjective process, an art. Those who can write well and understand the system can place their officers, the best and the good, at a distinct advantage compared to officers of like skill who do not have a senior rater who can write well. The problem with a totally subjective format is that it allows senior raters to hide their real assessment; they fail to "tell it like it is." One of General Patton's principles for life and leadership was "Say what you mean and mean what you say." While General Patton might not have been specifically speaking in terms of evaluation reports, his philosophy has definite merit. There are reports written than make those relieved of duty sound as though they are very competent leaders.

The NCO Evaluation (NCOER) process has taken steps to produce a more objective report and a report that values rater input. To state the rated NCO is the best, the rater must provide concrete examples of what he/she did to "be the best." An NCOER guide provides examples of what actions or accomplishments the Army considers "best." By giving objective reports on how an NCO performed, the boards can more easily distinguish the best, the good, and those that don't deserve promotion. The rater outlines the performance in bullet form. This allows boards to quickly read the comments and apply the "best" test. Changing the OER in this manner would not only establish objectivity to the report, but it would allow boards a better opportunity to read the rater comments. Currently, board members claim they don't have time to read rater comment and concentrate on the senior rater portion. Therefore, the rater, the person closest to the rated officer, has no effective input in the selection process. In most cases, the rater can be a "spoiler" only while the senior rater portion of the report is essentially used to discriminate between the records being reviewed.

Another complaint about the OER is that it forces distribution of a population in order to assist boards in sorting through the distinctly subjective and sometimes superfluous senior rater comments. This forced distribution methodology irritates both senior and junior officers. Junior officers are especially irritated when a senior rater sits them down and tells them he would give them an above center of mass (ACOM) but for the fact that he is saving it for someone else or that he will stair step the junior officer so he can give someone else a top block also. Typically, even the best officer might be awarded a center of mass (COM) block check because a senior rater's profile will not support a greater rating. Conversely, an officer might be given the benefit of doubt and awarded a top block rating because it is a second rating from the senior rater and if the rating was again COM, the officer might be placed at risk for future promotions. Evaluation reports built around these premises, where the system drives the train instead of performance,

are doomed to skepticism and lack of trust by those being evaluated. The result is a climate where junior officers have little faith in the system and little trust in their senior raters. The answer seems simple—eliminate the current use of forced distributions that really results in most officers feeling offended they are in the bottom 51% of officers being rated; a system where there is no center of mass, only a top 49% and bottom 51%. Let the objective and subjective assessments be the tool to decide careers, not the current forced distribution.

PROMOTIONS, BOARDS, AND SEPARATION POLICIES

The objective force needs leaders who not only know who to fight, but who are agile, adaptive, regionally smart, and capable of working with and leading coalition forces in politically sensitive environments. More than ever, the Army must ensure it truly selects the best leaders, ones who have garnered the experience, knowledge, and skills to lead a very technologically advanced Army in a very volatile and complex world. Thus, the Army should review promotion policies, board processes, and separation policies to ensure it develops, selects, and retains the leaders necessary to successfully lead the objective force.

The current officer promotion system does not fit the professional development process the Army advocates as necessary to gain the knowledge and experience to move to the next leadership level. The foundation for leadership knowledge and experience is the platoon leader. The Army acknowledges it places more and more responsibility on today's platoon leaders than ever before. Yet, the time spent in a platoon leader position is steadily decreasing and there are calls for promotion time to Captain to be reduced to 36 months in order to entice junior officers to stay in service and to meet captain assignment requirements. In a volatile, unambiguous, and complex world, the Army cannot afford to deprive junior leaders more time to develop as platoon leaders and junior staff officers. By design or not, the lieutenant years turn out to be the only real time officers spend learning and applying the fundamentals of leadership and developing their own leadership styles while being closely coached and mentored. Officers are allowed to grow during the lieutenant years—when they make captain they have no time to grow, they need to perform. Don't take away that time to grow.

There are enough years for captains to complete the mandatory professional development (branch qualification) assignments and take care of most other captain assignment requirements. Conversely, the major and lieutenant colonel years, especially for those competitive for command, are too few. The Army might benefit from promoting officers to major a year earlier. This would allow majors more time to get the key branch qualification jobs as well as develop regional, joint and other key skills lacking now and in the objective force.

Finally, the Army should look at promoting officers to Colonel a year later. Officers at this stage of their career are already looking at options—retention versus retirement. By remaining a lieutenant colonel longer, the Army ill have more assignment options, especially for those in the command track. The additional ne will allow for an additional assignment before either the War College or promotion to colonel to again refine leader skills or develop greater expertise.

Our promotion board process is quite sound. Although not perfect, the system overall is one of the fairest systems ever developed. However, as mentioned earlier, board members do not have enough time to review entire OERs, therefore, they only review senior rater input. Extending the time the board is in session and changing the OER format to one similar to the NCOER will do much to address this shortfall.

Finally, the Army should review its separation policies, specifically the "up or out" system. As the Army transforms into a more specialized and technologically advanced force, one capable of not only fighting wars but also responding to complex operations other than war, the need to retain experts will grow. While the Army has always relied on "new blood" to carry on technical expertise, the economy, mission, and technological advances will all cry for a greater stability and expertise within the force. George Wilson, in his book *Mud Soldiers*, proposes several unique, out-of-the-box recommendations for ensuring leadership quality keeps pace with Army change and changes to the environment. Based on his observance of an NTC rotation, he became convinced that "modern high-speed warfare requires officers and sergeants to spend years mastering it…"³¹ Currently, the Army discharges officers who are twice not selected for promotion and reassigns leaders in key jobs after only 18 to 24 months in that job. Future warfare will be much more complex, much faster moving, and much more difficult to control. The Army needs to find ways to better utilize experienced personnel assets to ensure it can meet the demands of the future.

The road will not be easy though. As the nation sees less and less head-to-head military competition and therefore chance for a major conflict or war, the civilian jobs will be the greater attraction for youth coming out of high school and college. The Army will face extreme competition with the business world, where the money is, and should expect to have to pay more for college and high school graduates or dip into lower aptitude populations to achieve accession goals in an all-volunteer force. When this happens, one could extrapolate that there will be a greater population within the service that will reach its maximum potential sooner than a population of greater aptitude and before retirement eligibility. The Army needs to look at ways to keep these trained and quality soldiers. The Army needs to look at removing mandatory separation requirements for those passed over due to end-strength requirements—

perhaps to implement a step pay raise and pay cut system that follows the civil service model. Either solution could keep personnel motivated and productive without promoting them above their comfort zone or capabilities. For those who fail to function promotion boards could still review their files for retainability, much like we do with the curre t "show-cause" system. The result should be an expert force and an Army that proves its loyalty to the soldiers but retaining those that continue to do a dependable and competent job even though they do not show potential for leadership at higher ranks. In the process, the Army would redefine "success" in a career.

DEVELOP LEADERS WHO MANAGE BUREAUCRACY AND ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY

There is growing acknowledgement that the Army is excessively bureaucratic and "politically correct," at all levels, in managing information and conducting business in support of national and military objectives. One possible reason that the Army became excessively bureaucratic is that as the information age exploded, leaders did not adapt quickly to what all this quick and abundant information would bring to the organizations they led. More information was better and there was a failed attempt to understand how to manage the quantity and timing of information flow. This situation grew exponentially worse with each new version of Windows and PowerPoint and the Army has never recovered. It is easy to overburden subordinates or subordinate units with information requests and bureaucratic requirements in this information-intensive age. This evolution has spawned micromanagement at a level that the Army has never experienced before. The bureaucracy, quite simply, has suffocated, strangled, and swallowed the individual pieces of the organization. The result has been a tangled web of micromanagement, failure to manage information flow, and a zero defect mentality that threatens the organization's initiative and its ability to attract and retain quality soldiers of all ranks. Project this out twenty years and you have a recipe for organizational disaster.

Transforming any organization is difficult in and of itself. During transformation, it is important that leadership competencies keep relatively constant in order to lend stability to the changing organization. During major organizational change, employees look for stability, placing their trust in senior leaders to guide them through the difficult process of learning new equipment, understanding procedures (doctrine), and finding the synergy they had under the "old system." Discipline, professionalism, creeds and codes of conduct, brotherhood of arms, and comradeship are those competencies in the military that provide stability. In instilling discipline to adhere to standards, leaders will foster the versatility, independence, and initiative that give the Army the ability to maintain effectiveness and dictate change in a fluid, uncertain,

situation. Organizations that build this level of discipline are lasting and master changes in technology and context without being mastered by them.³²

A question asked more frequently is: What is bothering the junior officers enough to lead them to abandon a job that has prestige, decent pay, good benefits, travel and excitement? Some say it's the micromanagement and zero defects mentality reflected by senior officers encouraged by the misapplication of technology. Its hard to keep motivated folks in when some of their jobs are as menial as determining level of attendance at parent teacher meetings.³³ While there has always been a feeling of micromanagement at various points in our military history, especially with junior leaders, the feeling now pervades all levels of Army leadership. James Goldsborough, in an article in the San Diego Union-Tribune, reported how General Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, felt micromanaged by the Secretary Defense and was not supported by Washington in the war in Kosovo.³⁴ Junior officers state time after time, survey after survey that senior leaders today hear that junior leaders do not want to be micro-managed but they are equally sure that senior officers are not really listening.

A troubling aspect of micromanagement is that it is so engrained in how we do business that even "good ideas" can quickly turn to micromanagement and even a feeling of mistrust or lack of trust between levels of leadership. Additionally, decisions are invariably made at the wrong level. Today, the predominant way to manage is to allow staffs to require report after report on every aspect of operations or administration because senior asks a question. Because information is so easy to acquire and package, leaders feel at ease to require certification after certification of reports sent to higher headquarters and to do so more quickly. This micromanagement can go too far though—when it does, it risks destroying trust and morale. Currently, there are Corps-level units that require 06/COL level written certification that a soldier was trained in a specific task—patently absurd. In other units you'll find senior leaders who personally inspect every vehicle prior to a deployment. What, then, is the role of junior leaders? Are these examples sending a message that senior leaders personally care for the health and welfare of soldiers and equipment or is the message indicating that he/she does not trust the subordinate leader to train, inspect, or inspect properly? When the senior leadership fosters this behavior, frustration sets in, trust dissolves, and further management tools are produced to track the policies. The end result is leaders who no longer enjoy leading and leaders who don't have time to get out with troops because their time is spent completing paperwork and briefs necessary to appease the system.

The information age presents another problem, that of managing the information flow in time and quantity. As senior leaders rely more on information flow through the computers and

the internet, they require more information and generally require it more quickly. There are battalion and brigade commanders who have grown up with computers and increased communications, but have not grown up knowing how to manage this. One devastating result is command via email, the most dangerous product of the information age. Here the commander spends an inordinate amount of timing passing on useless information and using email to explain in detail what might take only a minute in conversation or example. Instead of heading out to check training and teach or mentor, they sit in offices and review status reports and training brief slides 'ad nauseum.' The result is subordinate leaders are generally unsupervised and senior leaders are unaware of what really happens on the ground. In this respect, garrison duties are the worse and a subject of great discontent. Personnel in TDA units have become so inundated with developing, checking, transmitting, beautifying, and re-transmitting information that leaders forgot to get out and lead. Unfortunately, subordinates master only one thing—how to package a presentation. The phenomenon has resulted in PowerPoint being the method to communicate missions rather than mission orders.

The effect of micromanagement and poor time management is not just on the bureaucratic work place or office. The effects negatively impact other areas as well. There is something inherently wrong with our time management and conduct of leadership when Deputy Corps Commanders see their battalion commanders only twice a year during Training Management Reviews (TMR), when brigade commanders rarely visit company commanders in their training areas, and when battalion commanders think counseling and mentoring requirements are satisfied with a thirty minute visit to the M-16 range and the lieutenant running the range. One of the more discouraging aspects of this infatuation with bureaucracy is the missed opportunity for professional development and mentoring of junior leaders. Even the more competent and professional leaders are increasingly so busy that the focus on professional development of subordinates is lost to the fast pace and every day demands placed upon them. It's not that these senior leaders don't care. They do care, but they have become victims of the bureaucracy and of micromanagement.

General Reimer, as Chief of Staff of the Army, stated correctly, and ARI studies supported, "zero defects mentality is causing integrity problems in the officer corps." The zero defects mentality and climate encourages micromanagement by leaders unwilling to take the risk of their subordinate's failure. This mentality is bludgeoning the officer corps, ripping the heart of leadership competencies. There is a lack of tolerance for error, and an abundance of risk aversion. Good leaders accept risks and understand how to manage those risks without undue influence from zero defect mentality. A willingness to assume responsibility is the most

important of all qualities of leadership and is the one quality most at risk by bureaucracy and fear of failure.³⁷ Accepting risk and divorcing the Army from a zero defects mentality does not mean we satisfy ourselves with avoidable mistakes. On the contrary, we have become the greatest Army because we chose to do the right thing. The problem is that we allowed technology to drive leadership into management rather than allowing technology to support leadership.

The Army must develop leaders who can manage work and most importantly manage time. Nothing is more frustrating to a hard working individual than to be given a time limit too short to properly complete a task. One of the most critical aspects is to find leaders who can manage their calendars and therefore manage time. Leaders must be managers who can supervise the work and therefore free up enough time to allow themselves time to train, teach, and lead. Today, leaders end up doing too much of the work for the wrong reasons and at the wrong time. Learning how to supervise and take risk are leadership principles practiced too infrequently. Until we learn to control bureaucracy, we will continue to inundate leaders with work that takes them from the true task at hand—setting the conditions for soldier success on the modern battlefield. Too often leaders forget that real success lies in ensuring subordinates succeed. A leader and an organization are most successful when the subordinates do not fail. The best way for a leader to ensure success of subordinates is to ensure they are properly trained and mentored, not properly managed. To properly train someone requires leadership, not management.

IDENTIFYING FUTURE LEADERS

Military incompetence is a mental, military or moral lack of qualification⁴¹ and should never be tolerated by anyone in or out of uniform because the Army's business is to win our nation's wars and the implied task is to do so without undue risk to our soldiers. Military incompetence is not only a risk to our nation and our national interests, it is a direct risk to the lives of the soldiers. Therefore, one of the greatest responsibilities of senior leaders is to select future leaders for schooling and promotion. The Army's ability to identify future leaders is paramount to the success of the Army and the lives of its soldiers. The Army provides superior and ample training opportunities throughout one's career and the Army has one of the most fair promotion systems in the world. Selecting or allowing an incompetent officer (or NCO) to advance in rank should never be acceptable and the Army should go to great pains to ensure the best officers to lead the Army are selected for promotion and schooling and then are placed in greater leadership positions.

Our systems for identifying future leaders have done the Army well over its history. The relatively recent move from battlefield to bureaucracy has clouded the concept of what a leader should be and therefore, there are leaders out there who fall short of expectations of subordinates. More officers and NCOs are comfortable with management and not leadership. Jeane Kirkpatrick argues that good men are not necessarily good leaders⁴² and if you accept surveys and comments by junior leaders to be true, the Army might be picking good people but not necessarily good leaders.

In the quest to identify the best future leaders, is the Army confused or mixing leadership and management issues? What really makes a leader? I believe there is evidence that the Army is sending mixed messages on leadership and the junior officers are recognizing this and are voicing their displeasure through surveys and attrition. For example, there are still units that mandate line leaders (squad leaders, platoon sergeants, platoon leaders, commanders) wear green tabs to indicate these NCOs and officers are in leadership positions. So what are we teaching? Is a company commander a leader but a captain in the S3 shop as a battle captain or plans officer is not? Many officers and NCOs today believe they only have to lead when on duty or when in a "leadership" position. The Army is sending mixed messages on leadership and this is part of our current leadership problem.

Another mixed message the Army is sending concerns the privilege of command and selfless service. As captains leave the CCC, they are told to seek a command. By the nature of our force structure, many will have to command garrison or TDA units and the Army tells them that it is okay to command these units because "command is command." These same captains then read the recent Army message for LTCs selected for command. Keep in mind that these LTCs had an opportunity to decline consideration for command already. In that message, the LTCs are given an opportunity to decline the type unit they were selected to command without prejudice (ability to be selected for command in a later board). First of all, declining a category of command reeks of selfish service. If a family situation changes and they have a cause for deferral, then we already have that process. There is no "need" to decline command. Junior officers see the mixed message. They see leaders picking and choosing their way toward personal reward instead of selfless service. Command is a privilege and the Army should have developed leaders at this stage that are the epitome of selfless service.

The question remains—how does the Army do better at selecting the right personnel for promotion and advanced schooling and how does the Army better identify those officers selected for battalion and brigade command? Recommendations include administering OERs every six months for those in command tours and implementing a 360-degree evaluation

system.⁴³ The first recommendation adds to the bureaucracy by "throwing more work at the problem." Instead of more OERs, we need leadership that does a better job of assessing and developing subordinate leaders at each and every level. Senior leader emphasis should be on increasing face-to-face leadership development, not writing an additional OER.

Implementing a 360-degree evaluation for use in the evaluation and thence promotion process will provide yet another "excuse" for a senior leader to not get out of the office and really see what the rated subordinate is doing. Instituting a 360-degree evaluation sounds good in the feel good pure business world but it destroys effectiveness when placed in the complex, lethal, and unpredictable world of combat. The better answer is for the senior leader to get out from behind the desk and learn first-hand about his/her subordinates and how they interact with and lead their soldiers.

Does the Army have a good grasp on the desired leadership traits required of future leaders? Several traits have served the Army well in the past and will stand the test of time as the Army transforms to the objective force. Integrity, self-discipline and respect for the dignity of others should be the cornerstone of Army leadership and be the bedrock for what we look for in leaders. These three traits key ingredients of character. Neither is more important than the other, they are equally important because if any one is missing, leadership fails. If a leader is dishonest or can't be trusted, the nation is at risk because no one will be willing to sacrifice for someone that can't be trusted. Respect of others goes without explanation. Leadership is a people business and those that are not respected don't perform to potential and will eventually depart that leadership environment.

If a leader lacks self-discipline, then how can subordinates know he/she will do the right thing? Leaders must have the self-discipline to do the right thing, all the time. Leaders must have the self-discipline to learn, to manage time and other resources, to ask the difficult question, and to prepare themselves or their units for the most difficult missions under the most austere conditions. Self-discipline is paramount to leadership. Those who lack self-discipline will be slaves to activities not conducive to leadership behavior (such as money, luxury, sex, glory) and therefore cannot become trustworthy leaders. A trait that is embedded in this self-discipline concept is initiative and the accompanying willingness to assume responsibility along the way. A pre-World War II Army manual states that initiative is a direct product of self-confidence and willpower. Initiative indicates a confident, knowledgeable, self-motivated and self-disciplined individual. In the foreseeable future, information flow will be fast and furious. Decisions will many times have strategic level implications at much lower leadership levels than one may be fully trained to handle. If a leader does not have the self discipline and initiative to

keep pace with change in the army and world environment, he or she will not be capable to fully lead under the most trying conditions we see facing our military. The Army should focus leader development and selection on these three areas. As the cornerstone for leadership in the past, they will continue to be the cornerstone of leadership in the future.

THE FUTURE

The nature of future operations will be more complex, volatile, and lethal than ever experienced. Information flow will be quick and detailed. This combination will require leaders to know even more than is required now about what their subordinates know and what they are doing and what the senior leaders know and need information on. To successfully operate in this environment, leaders must be well-schooled in the region, understand and execute missions in accordance with strategic and operational objectives, and must trust and have the trust of their subordinates to ensure mission success and welfare of the soldiers. The Army must also learn to manage the bureaucracy so leaders are not so encumbered with system generated management tasks that they are unable to properly lead. The Army must inculcate the time-tested leadership and mentoring principles in such a manner as to best ensure that soldiers of tomorrow, operating in tomorrow's environment, are trained and equipped with knowledge and resources, to fight and win our nation's wars.

In question is the Army's ability as an organization to adapt to or negotiate needed change as it moves forward toward the objective force and the environment that force will operate in. Leaders must first know and understand present-day human nature. Today's young soldier is calling for the leader that encourages dialogue, innovation, challenge to the status quo – a leader that does not necessarily heed or agree, but always listens to subordinates. The Army's future needs to be more about motivating officers and subordinates to do the right thing, motivating troops, and properly dealing with those leaders who don't lead properly than it needs to be about how to report how many families attended a pre-deployment brief. The Army must do better at developing great leaders than great managers.

While no one can predict the future, the nature of Army leaders suggests that future officers and NCOs will probably opt to stay in service for the same reasons they do today-patriotism, love of soldiers, professional camaraderie, and challenges. It is correct application of the Army's leadership principles in the professional leader development process that will facilitate greater growth and success. The application process must be enduring over time, much like the law of the farm. According to the natural laws and principles, one must prepare the ground, put in the seed, cultivate, weed and water if one expects to reap a harvest. The

same is true for a marriage, and the same is true for developing future leaders. The leadership competencies will continue as they have in the past. The true mark will be how well the Army adapts and nurtures these principles through the challenges ahead and then selects those that meet leader expectations for future promotions and schooling.

The leadership development process must result in leaders who are competent, have the right education and experience through schooling and assignment processes, be of sound character and integrity, cherish dignity, have the self-discipline to always do what's right, and understand human nature and how they can influence human nature at any give point to accomplish the mission. The objective force leader must also be confident in his/her own abilities to operate independently if necessary and on operations with direct visibility to the highest levels of government and Army leadership. The leader must have the confidence in the capabilities of subordinates where trust between all is second nature and never questioned. No longer will the Army be able to survive with leaders who got by the system—actions will be too visible and results of incompetence too costly to national efforts in terms of life and mission success. The better the Army can improve tools—such as the OER, the assignment process, and the professional development process—to identify and develop leaders who can lead and not manage the Army to the objective force, the better off the Army and our Nation will be.

WORD COUNT: 11,292

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- ¹⁹ Patrick L. Townsend and Joan E. Gebhardt, <u>Five Star Leadership</u> (NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,1997), 199-201.
- ²⁰ Department of the Army, <u>Army Leadership</u>, Field Manual 22-100 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, August, 1999), 5-16.
- ²¹ In September 2001, DCSPER sent a team to the Army War College to ask former battalion commanders some questions on the OER. During discussions in one of the breakout sessions, the discussion turned briefly to mentoring and the role of commanders to mentor junior officers. The breakout session included about 15 former battalion commanders and it was during the discussion period that several battalion commanders indicated they only mentored those they thought had the potential to be senior leaders and others said they did not have the time to mentor all their subordinate officers.
- ²² Office of the Dean, United States Military Academy, <u>Summary Report of the Fourth</u> Annual Battalion Commanders' Focus Group Interviews (West Point, N.Y., January 2001), ii.
- ²³ ATLDP and ARI studies show many "faults" associated with current leadership practices. As Branch Chief at MP Branch from July 2000-July 2001, I was involved in surveys of officers exiting service. In questioning these officers on why they were getting out and whether they were satisfied with their senior leadership, many echoed sentiments of distrust (too many more concerned about their own careers) and that mentoring never really took place. I assessed some of these comments against some of the leadership study results and some of the leadership study findings I interpreted to what some of these officers were stating as they exited service.
- ²⁴ James H. Toner, <u>True Faith and Allegiance</u> (Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1995), 48.
- ²⁵ Ronald A. Heifetz, <u>Leadership without Easy Answers</u> (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1999), 21.
- ²⁶ The Army Training and Leader Development Panel, <u>Officer Study</u>, <u>Report to the Army</u>, Army Research Institute 2000; available from http://army.mil/features/ATLD/report.pdf; Internet, accessed on 26 October 2001.
- ²⁷ Mark A. Sabol and Robert A. Wisher, "Soldiers' Access to Distance Learning Training" U.S. Army Research Institute Newsletter, Fall 1999, 7.

²⁸ Kolenda, 152.

²⁹ Ibid.

- ³⁰ Porter B. Williamson, <u>General Patton's Principles for Life and Leadership</u> (Tucson: Management and Systems Consultants, Inc., 1988), 51-58.
- ³¹ George C. Wilson, <u>Mud Soldiers: Life Inside the New American Army</u> (NY: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1989), 254-255.
- ³² Christopher D. Kolenda, <u>Leadership: The Warrior's Art</u> (Carlisle: War College Foundation Press, 2001), 82.
- ³³ John Omicinski, "Army Attrition Brings Promotions, Criticism" <u>Olympian Newspaper</u>, available from http://news.theolympian.com/stories/20010901/ HomePageStories/98635.shtml>; accessed on 2 September 2001.
- ³⁴ James O. Goldsborough, "At War Against His Commanders", <u>The San Diego Union-Tribune</u>, July 30, 2001; available from <.http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/sandiego/index.html>; Internet, accessed 22 October 2001.
 - ³⁵ Weafer, 5.
- ³⁶ Thomas H. Rendall, COL, <u>Warriors or Bureaucrats? Why Officers Who Start Out to be Sam Damon End Up as Courtney Massengale</u>, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 9 Apr 2000), 7.
 - ³⁷ Kolenda, 196.
- ³⁸ Aubrey "Red" Newman, MG (R), <u>Follow Me: The Human Element in Leadership</u> (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1990), 278.
- ³⁹ Dandridge M. Malone, COL (R), <u>Small Unit Leadership: A Common Sense Approach</u> (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983), 152.
- ⁴⁰ Al Kaltman, <u>Cigars, Whiskey & Winning: Leadership Lessons from General Ulysses S.</u>
 <u>Grant</u> (Paramus, NJ, Prentice Hall Press, 1998), 297.
 - ⁴¹ Toner, 55.
 - ⁴² Ibid., 64.
 - 43 Rendall, 8.
 - 44 Kolenda, 17.
 - ⁴⁵ Townsend and Gebhardt, 93.
 - ⁴⁶ Covey, 161.

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